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Abstract
In this study, we theoretically investigate the potential role of the reference rate in stabilizing
or destabilizing an interbank market with an environment where individual banks cannot fully
identify the nature of underlying shocks a¤ecting their interbank transactions. We show that a
noise-free reference rate based on a su¢ cient number of sample transactions can help to make
the market interest rate less volatile, whereas the stabilizing e¤ects of the reference rate are
signicantly reduced if the reported interest rates contain some noisy components. Nevertheless,
by increasing the number of sample transactions reected in the reference rate, the adverse
e¤ects of the noise can be mitigated (or eliminated) provided the noise is idiosyncratic to
individual transactions. However, if the noise is common to multiple transactions, then the
adverse e¤ects of the noisy reference rate cannot be reduced simply by increasing the number
of sample transactions. This suggests that the noise in the interest rates reported by just a
few of large banks can end up making the entire market more volatile, thereby impairing the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
The role of the reference rate in interbank markets has become a major concern for various agents
active in nancial markets in light of the recent LIBOR manipulation problem. Policymakers the
world over are already debating possible measures to the reliability and e¢ cacy of interbank refer-
ence rates, but numerous issues have yet to be fully addressed by the existing literature, including
(i) the mechanism by which the reference rate contributes to nancial markets stabilization, (ii)
conditions under which the reference rate might actually serve to destabilize nancial markets, (iii)
the specic properties that might allow a reference rate to help stabilize nancial markets and
thereby enhance the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy.
In this study, we theoretically investigate the potential role of the reference rate in stabilizing
or destabilizing nancial markets, which is evaluated in terms of the volatility of interbank interest
rates. To this end, we introduce a simple interest rate model in which individual banks cannot fully
identify the nature of the underlying shocks that a¤ect individual interbank transactions. More
specically, we assume that the banks engaged in individual interbank transactions cannot distin-
guish whether the underlying shocks are specic to individual transactions or broadly inuential to
the entire interbank market.
This kind of imperfect information environment is analogous to the famous island economy
model developed by Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972, 1973) in the context of the output-ination
tradeo¤s and the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. We believe that our setup is useful to gain
insights into the potential role of the reference rate, since its most fundamental one is considered to
be the information it provides to individual banks. That is, the reference rate should ideally inform
individual banks of the aggregate nancial conditions that exist throughout the entire interbank
market, thereby helping these banks to set more appropriate interest rates in individual interbank
transactions and making the average interbank interest rate less volatile. Our framework allows for
the reference rate to play this sort of role, and also enables us to investigate how the existence of
distortions (or noise) in the reference rate can have a destabilizing impact.1
Our analysis based on a simple model of the interbank market contributes to the academic
literature by shedding light on the essential role of the reference rate in nancial market stability.2 ;3
However, our potential contribution is by no means limited to the issue of nancial stability. A
1Our study is similar to the argument of Morris and Shin (2002) in the sense that market participants react to the
noise included in the common signals. However, our framework is simpler than theirs because we do not introduce
any strategic complementarity among market participants.
2Although our theoretical setup is new to the literature, a previous empirical study provided by Angelini, Nobili,
Picillo (2011), who investigate interest rate determinants for individual transactions in the Italian interbank market,
does present an empirical model in which individual interbank interest rates are a¤ected by both bank-specic factors
and aggregate factors.
3Some previous studies, such as Freixas and Holthausen (2004) and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009),
construct theoretical models to explain the mechanisms determining the interest rates in interbank markets. However,
our study di¤ers in that we pay particular attention to the role of the reference rate in interbank markets.
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properly functioning interbank market is vital to the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy transmission.
In our model, the market interest rate should be perfectly correlated with the central banks interest
rate if information is perfect, while the average interest rate in the interbank market will tend to
deviate from the policy rate in an imperfect information world. We show that the existence of a
noise-free reference rate based on a su¢ cient number of sample transactions leads to an increased
correlation between the interbank rate and the policy rate, thereby enhancing the e¤ectiveness of
monetary policy transmission.
This study is obviously not an exhaustive investigation of topics relating to the reference rate.
For example, the recent LIBOR problem highlights a possible incentive for banks to manipulate
interest rates through their reporting. Our analysis assumes that noise in the reported interest rates
is purely exogenous, leaving the possibility of endogenous noise (manipulation) to other studies
such as Ewerhart et al. (2007).4 In addition, we have limited our focus to interbank markets.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the impact of interbank market stability (or instability) on the
aggregate economy, through the linkage between the interbank market and other macroeconomic
activities, should be examined in the context of dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, as
suggested by Woodford (2010).5 The ramications of the spread between the interbank interest
rates and the policy rate for monetary policymakers are also worthy of investigation. Finally, our
analysis does not consider potential problems arising from the o¤shorenature of LIBOR. Reasons
why o¤shore rates are used as the reference rates in many developed countries are briey explained
in some studies, but a deeper analysis of potential pitfalls should be the subject of future research.6
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our simple interest
rate model with unobserved components. In Section 3, we provide a benchmark analysis under the
assumption that individual banks can observe each component separately. In Section 4, we examine
how the results di¤er when individual banks are unable to observe each component separately. In
Section 5, we investigate the role of the reference rate in stabilizing the market interest rate. In
Section 6, we examine the implications of the noise in the reference rate. In Section 7, we present
some numerical examples to illustrate the role of the reference rate and the implications of noise in
the reference rate. Section 8 concludes our analysis.
4Empirical studies examining the possibility of LIBOR manipulation during global nancial crisis include Gyn-
telberg and Wooldridge (2008), Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012), and Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery (2012).
5Sudo (2012) explores the roles played by the interbank reference rate in business cycle uctuations using a DSGE
model with credit frictions, which is developed and estimated by Muto, Sudo, and Yoneyama (2012).
6Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008) present some potential reasons why the o¤shore rate is preferred as the
reference rate, including (i) fewer regulatory distortions, (ii) greater liquidity (for example, in the London and
Singapore markets), and (iii) greater diversity of participants in o¤shore markets (making them less vulnerable to
the actions of a few large institutions).
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2 Model
We consider a situation in which each bank cannot fully identify the sources of underlying shocks
that have an inuence on individual interbank transactions. Suppose that there are an innite
number of transactions (indexed by j = 1;    ;1) in an interbank market. The interest rate for
the jth transaction is determined by the following two equations:
ijt = i
p
t + E
j
t (!
j
t   t); (1)
!jt = t + "
j
t ; (2)
where ijt is the interest rate for the jth transaction and i
p
t is the policy interest rate. !
j
t is the
fundamental factor inuencing on the jth transaction (such as funding liquidity and counterparty
credit risk), t is the aggregate component of !
j
t , and "
j
t is the individual component of !
j
t .
7
(1) indicates that the banks in the jth transaction set the interest rate by adjusting the pol-
icy interest rate using their estimate of the deviation of factor !jt from its aggregate component:
Ejt (!
j
t  t).8 ;9 (2) indicates that the fundamental factor for the jth transaction consists of a shock
inuencing on the entire interbank market (t) and a shock specic to the jth transaction ("
j
t ).
These equations capture a situation in which the banks identify the individual shocks in the jth
transaction and then take account of these shocks in determining their individual interest rate.
This kind of framework with imperfect information is analogous to the famous island economy
model introduced by Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972, 1973) in the context of the output-ination
tradeo¤s and the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. Although our study is the rst to apply this setup
to interbank markets, the idea that individual interest rates in interbank markets are determined
by both bank-specic and aggregate factors is shared with a recent empirical study by Angelini,
Nobili, and Picillo (2011).
7 In this study we do not specify the fundamental factors which determine the spread between interbank interest
rates and the policy interest rate. The issue of whether liquidity factors or counterparty risk factors are dominant as
the determinants of LIBOR-OIS spread, especially after the onset of nancial crisis, is examined by many authors,
such as Michaud and Upper (2008), Taylor and Williams (2009), and Gefang, Koop and Potter (2011).
8We assume that the aggregate component is accommodated by the policy interest rate, although private agents
are unable to infer the value of t from movements in the policy rate due to the complexity of its determination
mechanism. Consideration of market participantsinferences from the policy rate is left for future research. Another
important issue worthy of examination is the inuence of any central bank misperception of the aggregate component.
From a macroeconomic perspective, Muto (2013) examines the impact of central bank transparency regarding the
banks views on the aggregate state of economy in a framework that allows for misperceptions on the part of both
the central bank and private agents.
9 It is quite straightforward to introduce a constant (or purely exogenous) component of the spread between the
interbank interest rate and the policy interest rate, although we have refrained from doing so here.
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For simplicity, we assume that each shock follows the i.i.d. normal distribution:
t  N(0; 2); (3)
"jt  N(0; 2"): (4)
In the following argument we assume that the banks in the jth transaction observe the realization
of !jt . Therefore, (1) can be rewritten as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + !
j
t   Ejtt; (5)
However, the banks do not necessarily observe the values of t and "
j
t separately, although they
do know that these shocks follow the processes of (3) and (4) respectively.10
3 When each component is observable
For benchmarking purposes we begin by assuming that the banks in the jth transaction can observe
the realizations of t and "
j
t separately. Then the banksestimate of the aggregate component (E
j
tt)
is exactly the same as the true value of t. Therefore, from (2) and (5), the interest rate in the jth
transaction is determined as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + "
j
t : (6)
The overall average of the interest rates (hereafter the market interest rate), denoted by imt ,
is computed as follows by summing up the individual interest rates:
imt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
ijt = i
p
t + lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
"jt = i
p
t : (7)
The spread between the market interest rate and the policy interest rate, denoted by ist , is zero:
ist  imt   ipt = 0: (8)
The variance of the spread is also zero:
V ar(ist ) = 0: (9)
10We also assume that all banks observe the policy rate level iPt .
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4 When each component is unobservable
Next we assume that the banks in the jth transaction cannot observe the realizations of t and "
j
t
separately and only observe the sum of these components: !jt . In this situation, the banks need to
make an estimate of the aggregate component t in order to determine interest rates for individual
transactions.
Suppose that the banks know the variances of t and "
j
t : 
2
 and 
2
". Then standard statistical
inference yields the following estimator of t:
Ejtt = !
j
t ; where  
2
2 + 
2
"
: (10)
By substituting (10) into (5), the interest rate in the jth transaction is determined as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + (1  )!jt = ipt + (1  )(t + "jt ): (11)
By summing up the individual interest rates, the market interest rate is computed as follows:
imt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
ijt = i
p
t + (1  )t + (1  ) lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
"jt = i
p
t + (1  )t: (12)
Therefore, the spread ist is non-zero:
ist = i
m
t   ipt = (1  )t: (13)
The variance of the spread is also non-zero11 :
V ar(ist ) = (1  )22: (14)
This result indicates that the market interest rate will tend to be more volatile when banks
cannot precisely identify the underlying shocks to their individual transactions.
5 The role of the reference rate
So far we have implicitly assumed that individual banks are unable to observe the market interest
rate imt . This is a quite realistic assumption since individual players in a real-world interbank
market can rarely observe the overall average of the interest rate across all interbank transactions.
However, banks do usually observe a sample average for some fraction of interbank transactions due
11As shown in (7), the market interest rate coincides with the policy rate if each shock is observable. Therefore,
the variance of the spread between the market interest rate and the policy rate is a good measure of the severity of
distortions in the interbank market arising from informational imperfections.
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to the existence of reference rates, such as LIBOR. Here we consider the role of interbank reference
rates.
Suppose that there exists an institution which organizes an interbank market. The institution
collects data on interest rates used in interbank transactions and provides these data to individual
banks. Specically, the institution selects q numbers of transactions and averages the interest rates
used in these transactions:
iqt 
1
q
qX
k=1
ikt : (15)
The institution then announces the value of iqt to individual banks as the reference rate of interbank
interest rates.12
Dene !qt as the fundamental factor corresponding to i
q
t :
!qt 
1
q
qX
k=1
!kt = t + "
q
t ; (16)
where "qt is dened as "
q
t  1q
qX
k=1
"kt .
Note that the distribution of "qt is as follows:
"qt  N(0; 2"=q): (17)
Here we assume that individual banks can acquire the knowledge of !qt by observing the value
of iqt . This means that, owing to the presence of the reference rate, individual banks can utilize the
information on !qt to infer the value of aggregate component t.
13
The banks know that !qt consists of t and "
q
t , but they do not observe each component sepa-
rately. Based on (3) and (17), statistical inference yields the following estimator of t:
Ejtt = !
q
t ; where  
2
2 + 
2
"=q
: (18)
Note that the coe¢ cient  is larger than  when q is greater than unity. By substituting (18)
12We assume that every bank not selected in the sample transactions observes the same value of iqt . In addition,
we assume that a bank selected in the sample transactions observes all sample interest rates except for the banks
own interest rate. This means that the sample size reected in the reference rate is q for the former bank and q   1
for the latter bank. This di¤erence suggests that the estimators of t made by these banks are slightly di¤erent.
However, since there exist an innite number of transactions in the interbank market, the impact of this di¤erence
on the entire market can be regarded as negligible and an explicit consideration of this di¤erence does not alter the
essence of our argument.
13For simplicity, we assume that individual banks use only the information of !qt . In the Appendix, we conrm
that the results are essentially the same even if banks use both !jt and !
q
t .
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into (5), the interest rate in the jth transaction is determined as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + !
j
t   !qt : (19)
From (15) and (19), the average interest rate across the sample of q transactions is
iqt =
1
q
qX
k=1
(ipt + !
k
t   !qt ) = ipt + (1  )!qt : (20)
Therefore, as we assumed above, if the market-organizing institution provides data on iqt to
individual banks, these banks can obtain the value of !qt , via the simple calculation (i
q
t ipt )=(1 ) =
!qt .
From (2), (16), and (19), the market interest rate is
imt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
ijt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
(ipt + !
j
t   !qt )
= lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
(ipt + t + "
j
t   t   "qt )
= ipt + (1  )t + lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
"jt    lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
"qt
= ipt + (1  )t   "qt : (21)
Therefore, the spread between the market interest rate and the policy rate is
ist = i
m
t   ipt = (1  )t   "qt : (22)
The variance of the spread is
V ar(ist ) = (1  )22 + 22"=q: (23)
Therefore, the variance of the spread depends on the number of sample transaction (q). If q
approaches innity, V ar(ist ) converges to zero:
lim
q!1V ar(i
s
t ) = lim
q!1
24 1  2
2 + 
2
"=q
!2
2 +
 
2
2 + 
2
"=q
!2
2"=q
35 = 0: (24)
This means that, if the reference rate reects the interest rates across all interbank transactions,
then the volatility of the market interest rate due to informational imperfections is completely elim-
inated. In this case, the reference rate provides a perfectly accurate information on the aggregate
shock. Then, the market interest rate is perfectly stabilized, as in the case of Section 3 where
8
individual banks can observe each shock separately.
In another limiting case of q = 1, however,  is equal to  and V ar(ist ) is calculated as below:
V ar(ist ) = (1  )22 + 22": (25)
By comparing (25) with (14), we nd that V ar(ist ) in this section is larger than those presented
in Section 4. This might be somewhat counterintuitive since it indicates that the existence of
the reference rate makes the market interest rate more volatile. This phenomenon occurs because
individual components included in the reference rate do not completely cancel each other out when q
is very small. Since every individual bank observes the same reference rate, the averaged individual
component included in the reference rate ("qt ) a¤ects each individual interest rate to an equal
degree. This distorting e¤ect of the reference rate is particularly large when the number of sample
transactions is extremely small.
However, such an e¤ect can be reduced by increasing the number of sample transactions. This
can be conrmed by rewriting (23) as below:
V ar(ist ) =
2
2
"
q2 + 
2
"
: (26)
Thus, V ar(ist ) is monotonically decreasing with q. Therefore, by increasing the number of q,
V ar(ist ) can be decreased. A simple calculation conrms that V ar(i
s
t ) in this section is smaller than
the corresponding value in Section 4, if and only if q is larger than a threshold value:
q > 2 +
2
2"
: (27)
Therefore, when the sample number is su¢ ciently large, the reference rate helps to make the
market interest rate less volatile. The mechanism is that the reference rate based on a su¢ cient
number of sample transactions provides good information on the aggregate shock which is inuential
to the entire interbank market. This helps individual banks to identify more accurately the sources
of shocks arising in the interbank market and to set individual interest rates at more appropriate
levels.
6 Noise in the reference rate
In the previous section, we showed that the existence of a reference rate can reduce the volatility of
the market interest rate. What if the reference rate includes some noisy components? The recent
LIBOR problem suggests that this is a very real possibility, in which case the reference rate might
not correctly reect the interest rates actually used in interbank transactions.
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In this section we consider the impact of the noise in the reference rate from the perspective
of interbank market stability. In doing so, we make allowance for two di¤erent kinds of noise: (i)
idiosyncratic noise, which is specic to individual transactions, and (ii) common noise, which has
an inuence on all transactions.
6.1 The case of idiosyncratic noise
As in Section 5, we assume that a market-organizing institution collects the data on interest rates
used in individual interbank transactions. Here we also assume that the reported data for the
interest rate in the kth transaction (denoted by bikt ) includes idiosyncratic noise kt :
bikt = ikt + kt ; (28)
where this noise follows the i.i.d. normal distribution:
kt  N(0; 2): (29)
The institution provides the average of the reported (not necessarily actual) interest rates:
biqt  1q
qX
k=1
bikt = 1q
qX
k=1
ikt + 
q
t ; (30)
where qt is dened as
qt 
1
q
qX
k=1
kt : (31)
The distribution of qt is as follows:
qt  N(0; 2=q): (32)
Dene b!qt as the fundamental factor corresponding to biqt :
b!qt  t + "qt + qt : (33)
We assume that individual banks can acquire the knowledge of b!qt by observing the value ofbiqt . The banks know that b!qt consists of t, "qt , and qt , but they do not observe each component
separately. Based on (3) (17), and (32), statistical inference yields the following estimator of t:
Ejtt = b!qt ; where   22 + 2"=q + 2=q : (34)
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By substituting (34) into (5), the interest rate in the jth transaction is determined as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + !
j
t   b!qt : (35)
From (30), (33), and (35), the average of the reported interest rates is
biqt = 1q
qX
k=1
(ipt + !
k
t   b!qt ) + qt
= ipt + (1  )b!qt : (36)
Therefore, as we assumed above, if the market-organizing institution provides the data of biqt to
individual banks, the banks can obtain the value of b!qt via the simple calculation (biqt   ipt )=(1  ) =b!qt .
From (2), (33), and (35), the market interest rate is
imt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
ijt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
(ipt + !
j
t   b!qt )
= lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
(ipt + t + "
j
t   t   "qt   qt )
= ipt + (1  )t   "qt   qt : (37)
Therefore, the spread between the market interest rate and the policy rate is
ist = i
m
t   ipt = (1  )t   "qt   qt : (38)
The variance of the spread is
V ar(ist ) = (1  )22 + 2(2" + 2)=q: (39)
We can rewrite (39) as follows:
V ar(ist ) =
2(
2
" + 
2
)
q2 + 
2
" + 
2

: (40)
By comparing (26) and (40), we nd that, for any value of q > 0, V ar(ist ) is larger when
the idiosyncratic noise is present (2 > 0) rather than when it is absent (
2
 = 0). Therefore,
idiosyncratic noise makes the market interest rate more volatile.
However, the size of the destabilizing e¤ect depends on the number of sample transactions (q).
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In the limiting case of q !1, the variance of the spread converges to zero:
lim
q!1V ar(i
s
t ) = lim
q!1
24 1  2
2 + 
2
"=q + 
2
=q
!2
2 +
 
2
2 + 
2
"=q + 
2
=q
!2
(2" + 
2
)=q
35 = 0:
(41)
Therefore, even if idiosyncratic noise is included in the reported interest rates, the market
interest rate can be made less volatile by basing the reference rate on a larger number of sample
transactions.
6.2 The case of common noise
Next we assume that the reported interest rates include common noise t, which has an inuence
on all transactions: bikt = ikt + t; (42)
where this noise follows the i.i.d. normal distribution:
t  N(0; 2): (43)
The institution provides the average of the reported interest rates to individual banks:
biqt  1q
qX
k=1
bikt = 1q
qX
k=1
ikt + t: (44)
In this case, the fundamental factor corresponding to biqt is
b!qt  t + "qt + t: (45)
We assume that individual banks can acquire the knowledge of b!qt by observing the value ofbiqt . The banks know that b!qt consists of t, "qt , and t, but they do not observe each component
separately. Based on (3), (17), and (43), statistical inference yields the following estimator of t:
Ejtt = b!qt ; where   22 + 2"=q + 2 : (46)
By substituting (46) into (5), the interest rate in the jth transaction is determined as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + !
j
t   b!qt : (47)
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From (44), (45), and (47), the average of the reported interest rates is
biqt = 1q
qX
k=1
(ipt + !
j
t   b!qt ) + t
= ipt + (1  )b!qt : (48)
Therefore, as we assumed above, if the market-organizing institution provides the data on biqt to
individual banks, the banks can obtain the value of b!qt by calculating (biqt   ipt )=(1  ) = b!qt .
From (2), (45), and (47), the market interest rate is
imt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
ijt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
(ipt + !
j
t   b!qt )
= lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
(ipt + t + "
j
t   t   "qt   t)
= ipt + (1  )t   "qt   t: (49)
The spread between the market interest rate and the policy rate is
ist = i
m
t   ipt = (1  )t   "qt   t: (50)
The variance of the spread is
V ar(ist ) = (1  )22 + 2(2"=q + 2): (51)
Therefore, the variance of the spread depends on the sample number of transactions. However,
in the presence of common noise in the reference rate, the volatility of the market interest rate
cannot be eliminated simply by increasing the number of transactions:
lim
q!1V ar(i
s
t ) = lim
q!1

(1  )22 + 2(2"=q + 2)

= lim
q!1
24 1  2
2 + 
2
"=q + 
2

!2
2 +
 
2
2 + 
2
"=q + 
2

!2
(2"=q + 
2
)
35
=
 
2
2 + 
2

!2
2 +
 
2
2 + 
2

!2
2 : (52)
Therefore, when the noise is common to multiple transactions, the variance of the spread does
not necessarily converge to zero, even if the number of sample transactions becomes quite large.
This result is obtained by the following two reasons. First, the value of  does not approach unity
even if q goes to innity, since the upper limit of  is 2=(
2
 + 
2
), which is strictly smaller than
unity. As a result, the rst term of (51) does not approach zero. Second, as indicated by the third
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term of (50), the value of t is not cancelled out when we sum up the individual interest rates
because of the inherent nature of common noise. This result suggests that the existence of the
reference rate does not necessarily help to reduce the volatility of the market interest rate in cases
where noise has a broader (or even market-wide) impact.
7 Numerical examples
So far we have explained the role of the reference rate and the implications of the noise in the
reference rate. Our theoretical results suggest that the inuence of the reference rate on the volatility
of the market interest rate depends on (i) the number of interbank transaction reports reected in
the reference rate (q), (ii) the variances of shocks (2 and 
2
"), and (iii) the variances of noise (
2

and 2). We now present some numerical examples in the hope of illustrating these relationships.
For our benchmark example we set the variances of shocks and noise to 2 = 
2
" = 
2
 = 
2
 = 1:0.
We then calculate the variance of the interest rate spread (V ar(ist )) for various values of q, the
number of interbank transaction reports reected in the reference rate.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between V ar(ist ) and q for the situations examined in Section 3,
4, 5, 6.1, and 6.2, while Figure 2 shows the corresponding level of parameters of inference, such as
, , , and . In the case of Section 3, where banks can distinguish between aggregate shocks and
individual shocks, V ar(ist ) is equal to zero for all values of q. In the case of Section 4, where banks
are unable to observe each shock separately, V ar(ist ) is not equal to zero. As shown in Figure 2,
the parameter of inference () does not depend on q. Consequently, V ar(ist ) is positively constant
(0.25 in this benchmark example) for all values of q. In the case of Section 5, the reference rate
exists and is noise-free. When q is extremely small, such as q = 1 or 2, V ar(ist ) is larger than 0.25,
which is the corresponding value in Section 4. However, since V ar(ist ) is monotonically decreasing
with q, V ar(ist ) is less than 0.25 for su¢ ciently large values of q (specically, q > 4 in this numerical
example), and converges to zero when q approaches innity. This illustrates the stabilizing e¤ects
of the reference rate.
However, if the reference rate contains noisy components, the stabilizing e¤ects of the reference
rate are signicantly reduced. In the case of Section 6.1 when the reference rate includes idiosyn-
cratic noise, V ar(ist ) is larger than those in the case of Section 5, for a given value of q. Nevertheless,
since the noise is idiosyncratic to individual transactions, the volatility of the market interest rate
can be reduced by increasing q. However, in the case of common noise, which is examined in Section
6.2, V ar(ist ) does not converge to zero even if q approaches innity. By increasing the value of q,
the rst term of (51) converges to 0.25. However, because of the presence of the third term of (51),
V ar(ist ) is strictly larger than 0.25, which is the corresponding level in Section 4.
Figure 3 presents a sensitivity analysis with respect to the variances of fundamental shocks.
Panel (a) shows the case in which the variance of the aggregate shock is larger than the benchmark
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value (2 = 5:0). For a given value of q, the parameters of inference (, , , and ) are larger than
those in the benchmark example. Then, V ar(ist ) is lower than the benchmark value in the case of
Section 4. However, in the cases of Section 5, 6.1, and 6.2, V ar(ist ) is larger than the benchmark
value. This result can be understood as follows. In the presence of the reference rate, if 2 is large
(compared to 2"), banks set the inference parameter at a higher value, because banks know that the
reference rate contains more accurate information on the aggregate component. Higher inference
parameters translate into higher nal terms in (23), (39), and (51), thereby magnifying the volatility
of the market interest rate. In the case of Section 4 where the reference rate is non-existent, this
e¤ect is absent. Then the rise of 2 simply increases the inference parameter (), thereby lowering
V ar(ist ).
Panel (b) shows the case in which the variance of the idiosyncratic shock is larger than the
benchmark value (2" = 5:0). For a given value of q, the parameters of inference (, , , and ) are
smaller than those in the benchmark example. Then, V ar(ist ) is larger than the benchmark level
in all situations. In the case of Section 4, lower inference parameter () leads to higher V ar(ist ), as
shown in (14). This e¤ect also exists in other cases, as shown in the rst terms of (23), (39), and
(51). In addition, larger 2" magnies V ar(i
s
t ) by increasing the nal terms in (23), (39), and (51).
As a result, for a given value of q, larger 2" leads to higher V ar(i
s
t ) in all situations.
Figure 4 presents a sensitivity analysis with respect to the variances of noise in the reported
interest rates. Panel (a) shows the case in which the variance of idiosyncratic noise (2) is larger
than the benchmark level. This rise in 2 simply lowers the parameter of inference in Section 6.1
(), for a given value of q. Then, V ar(ist ) is larger than in the benchmark example. Panel (b)
shows the case in which the variance of common noise is larger than the benchmark level. The rise
in 2 simply lowers the parameter of inference in Section 6.2 (), for a given value of q. Then,
V ar(ist ) is larger than in the benchmark example. These results indicate that the market interest
rate becomes more volatile for large variances in either idiosyncratic noise or common noise.
8 Conclusion
In this study, we have theoretically investigated the potential role of the reference rate in stabilizing
or destabilizing an interbank market with an environment where individual banks cannot fully
identify the nature of underlying shocks a¤ecting their interbank transactions. We have shown that
a noise-free reference rate based on a su¢ cient number of sample transactions can help to make the
market interest rate less volatile, whereas the stabilizing e¤ects of the reference rate are signicantly
reduced if the reported interest rates contain some noisy components. Nevertheless, by increasing
the number of sample transactions reected in the reference rate, the adverse e¤ects of the noise can
be mitigated (or eliminated) provided the noise is idiosyncratic to individual transactions. However,
if the noise is common to multiple transactions, then the adverse e¤ects of the noisy reference rate
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cannot be reduced simply by increasing the number of sample transactions. This suggests that the
noise in the interest rates reported by just a few of large banks can end up making the entire market
more volatile, thereby lowering the correlation between the interbank interest rate and the central
banks policy rate, and consequently impairing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Appendix: When banks use !jt and !
q
t to infer the aggregate component
In Section 5, we have assumed that individual banks only use the information obtainable from the
reference rate (!qt ) to infer the aggregate component (t). Here we assume that banks additionally
use the information on the fundamental shock in their individual transaction (!jt ). This means that
the banksestimator of t takes the following form:
Ejtt = 1!
j
t + 2!
q
t : (A1)
Then, from (2), (4), (16), (17), and (A1), the parameters of 1 and 2 are computed as follows:
1 =
2
(1 + q)2 + 
2
"
; (A2)
2 =
q2
(1 + q)2 + 
2
"
: (A3)
By substituting (A1) into (5), the interest rate in the jth transaction is determined as follows:
ijt = i
p
t + (1  1)!jt   2!qt : (A4)
The average interest rate across this sample of transactions is
iqt =
1
q
qX
k=1

ipt + (1  1)!kt   2!qt

= ipt + (1  1   2)!qt : (A5)
Therefore, if the market-organizing institution provides the data of iqt to individual banks, the
banks can obtain the value of !qt , from the simple calculation (i
q
t   ipt )=(1  1   2) = !qt .
From (2), (16), and (A4), the market interest rate is
imt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
ijt = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
h
ipt + (1  1)!jt   2!qt
i
= lim
n!1
1
n
nX
j=1
h
ipt + (1  1)(t + "jt )  2(t + "qt )
i
= ipt + (1  1   2)t   2"qt : (A6)
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Therefore, the spread between the market interest rate and the policy rate is
ist = i
m
t   ipt = (1  1   2)t   2"qt : (A7)
The variance of this spread is
V ar(ist ) = (1  1   2)22 + 222"=q: (A8)
In the limiting case of q !1, the volatility of the spread converges to zero:
lim
q!1V ar(i
s
t ) = lim
q!1
 
1  (1 + q)
2

(1 + q)2 + 
2
"
!2
2 +
 
q2
(1 + q)2 + 
2
"
!2
2"=q = 0: (A9)
This result is the same as in Section 5.
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Figure 2: Parameters of inference and the number of transactions reflected in the reference rate
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis with respect to shock variances
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis with respect to noise variances
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